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Sotirios A. Barbert

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF THE FEDERALIST

I argue here that the general theory of constitutional government in The Federalist favors judicial activism. I conceive judicial
activism as the practice of judges forming their best understanding
of general constitutional ideas and acting, if need be, without deference to legislative or community opinion.'
I emphasize at the outset that this article is not designed to
justify judicial activism by appealing to the alleged intentions of
the framers. I have tried to defend judicial activism elsewhere, and
that defense is not primarily an appeal to assumed historical authority.2 Nor do I assume that The Federalistis either the sole or
even the main source of evidence of the framers' intent. Rather
than confront the difficult meta-interpretive issues concerning
framers intent,3 I proceed here on the reasonably safe assumption
that The Federalist is one of the several prominent sources of
framers' intent. I do not assume-though I see no reason to
deny-that the authors of The Federalist understood or would
have accepted the full implications of what they wrote in defense
of judicial review. I aim only at a plausible interpretation of what
they wrote.
In analyzing The Federalist,I shall refer to its authors jointly
as "Publius," thus adopting their pen name for my purposes. By
0 1988, Sotirios A. Barber.
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referring to Publius instead of Hamilton, Madison and Jay, I acknowledge that my analysis is, as all similar analyses are, an interpretation-a plausible imputation at best, defensible partly on historical but ultimately on moral grounds, since the overall purpose
of such interpretations is to make an argument about how the
community should conduct an aspect of its affairs.4 So in this paper, "Publius" is not Madison and Hamilton separately or as historically bounded persons. "Publius" is who The Federalistimplicitly says Publius is: Madison and Hamilton (in the main) together
and therefore reconciled, and both together addressing what they
assume to be a community that embraces both their generation
and what their constitutional proposal calls their "Posterity."5
The main objective of this paper is to show through an examination of The Federalistthat the framers' position on judicial activism may not be what the judiciary's modern critics say it is.
Though the critics I have in mind reason from diverse premises
and philosophic positions,6 they arrive at the same basic prescription: judges should defer to others in constitutional cases that require controversial judgements of political morality. These critics
of judicial power reserve most of their hostility for controversial
cases arising under what they typically term the "vague" provisions of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment. They usually oppose a
role for moral philosophy in judicial decision and call for historical
research into "framers' intent" as the preferred means of controlling judicial discretion. They frequently invoke the authority of
' For a defense of this understanding of interpretation, see Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S.Cal.L.Rev. 279, 286, 388-96 (1985).
1I join a number of writers in rejecting the "split personality" view of The Federalist,
but I do so partly because I read The Federalistwith an eye toward illuminating a normative debate. Those who assume that a work speaks to a practical question one way or another (as is typical of commentators who invoke The Federalistin practical argument) commit themselves to interpreting the work in a manner that would enable it to function in a
practical argument. (Those who argue for ignoring a work would emphasize its inconsistencies and other normative liabilities.) Such interpretaters must find ways to iron out the
material's inconsistencies, as I try to do in at least one part of my analysis here, on Federalist 78's reference to a strict practice of stare decisis. For an overview of the historians' debate, see, Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, 1 Win. &
Mary Q. 97, 235 (1944); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Federalist-A Split Personality, 57
Amer.Hist.Rev. 625 (1952); George W. Carey, Publius-A Split Personality? 46 Rev. of Pol.
5 (1984).
6 Compare Sotirios A. Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Philosophy in Constitutional Law, 54 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 253 (1986), with Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 Ind.L.J. 1, 10-11 (1983).
1 See Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 San
Diego L.Rev. 823, 825-27 (1986); Chiristopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review
108-13 (1986).
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The Federalistas part of their argument that the framers opposed
judicial activism."
Yet versions of framers' intent vary, and a few exponents of
judicial activism have relied on theories of the founding that differ
from the theories of the judiciary's modern critics.9 These activist
appeals to framers' intent cannot hope to convert everyone, of
course. 10 But the fact that there are conflicting versions of framers'
intent should suggest that imputations to the framers do not flow
simply from historical facts regarding the framers. They flow also
from controversial background theories of those facts, namely, theories of who the framers were, what constitutes evidence of their
intentions, and what aspect of their intentions should be
authoritative."
In this paper I argue, through a more sustained examination of
The Federalist's treatment of judicial power than is elsewhere
available, 2 that The Federalistdoes support an active judiciary. A
plausible interpretation of The Federalistthat favors judicial activism hardly forecloses the possibility of future arguments that
advocate a different view of what the framers intended for judicial
power. But if successful, this paper and similar arguments would
transform the nature of the debate over framers' intent. They
would succeed in establishing that it will take a multifaceted and
persuasive political theory of the American founding to establish
any particular picture of the framers's views on judicial activism.
The kind of political theory to which I refer stands in opposition to

' See, for example, Raoul Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 296, 310-11 (1986); Walter Berns, The Constitution as Bill of Rights, in
Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., How Does the Constitution Secure
Rights 50, 66 (1985); Judge Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, in 1984 Yearbook of S.Ct.Hist.Soc. 53; Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review at 74-77 (cited in
note 7).
9 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv.L.Rev. 885 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, Consensus and Objectivity in Early Constitutional Interpretation: An Unproven Thesis, 65 Tex.L.Rev. 859 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell,
The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1513 (1987); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan.L.Rev. 29 (1985); Stephen
Macedo, The New Right v. the Constitution (1986).
10See Berger, 54 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. (cited in note 8) (criticizing Powell, 98 Harv.L.Rev.
885 (cited in note 9)).
'
See Dworkin, 56 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 471-500 (cited in note 1).
12 For broader recent treatments of The Federalist, see Sunstein, 38 Stan.L.Rev. 29
(cited in note 9); Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution (1987);
David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist (1984). I share aspects of Sunstein's understanding of The Federalist as a whole. I elaborate and defend here a position
close to his cautious suggestion that judicial activism "in pursuit of republican goals may be
both desirable and legitimate." 38 Stan.L.Rev. at 85 and, more generally, at 79.
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the "absolutistic positivism and flaccid historicism" that characterizes much of the current debate on framers' intent." This shift to
new modes of inquiry and persuasion would be a major change. To
argue from a political theory to a particular view of framers' intent
would be to argue philosophically, and philosophic arguments appeal to reason, not ancestral authority.
II.

PUBLIUS ON RESPONSIBILITY IN GOVERNMENT

The problem that dominates American constitutional theory
in our century is that of reconciling the power of an electorally
unaccountable judiciary with norms of democratic responsibility.
But since problems are largely what they are perceived to be, our
century's problem with the judiciary may reflect a defect in our
own thinking, especially our conception of democratic responsibility. Sanford Levinson has recently pointed out that John Marshall
was comfortable with judicial power because he conceived accountability not just in terms of responsibility to someone, but, more
importantly, responsibility for a certain set of objectives. The judiciary was supposed to serve the latter, and Marshall thought the
latter was constitutionally more important. 4 We shall see that the
same is true of Publius. Publius's theory of judicial power is part
of his general theory of responsible government. The story starts at
a point in The Federalistwell before Publius focuses on the power
of the federal courts.
We have to begin with Publius's reason for wanting a new constitution in the first place: he regards the government under the
Articles of the Confederation as a bad government. The overall arrangement of confederal and state governments is a failure, he believes, because it is unable to handle social problems such as commercial rivalries among the states, declining investor confidence in
the face of paper money and other debtor relief laws of the states,
the inability to raise revenues and troops for purposes like retiring
the war debt, and the failure to inspire foreign respect for treaty

13 The quoted phrase is Herbert Storing's characterization of modern judicial attempts
to escape the difficult problems of practical principle involved in applying the bill of rights
to concrete cases. See Herbert Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in Goldwin
and Schambra, eds., How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? 15, 26 (cited in note 8). For
a related complaint, see Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, The New Republic 23-25 (Sept. 28, 1987). Readers who know Professor Storing's work will quickly recognize
his influence on my thinking, though some will say that I deviate from his views.
'1 Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Tastes in Constitutional Interpretation, Dissent
(forthcoming summer 1988).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:836

obligations and domestic respect for the consequences of sedition.1 5
Not only does "[t]he imbecility of our Government" defeat hopes
for national security, prosperity, and honor,16 but the Confederation's fragmentation of effective institutional power reinforces disintegrative tendencies and territorial rivalries that can eventually
17
lead to war among the states.
This practical concern for ameliorating real problems of national security, order, wealth, credit and honor is basic to Publius's
outlook; it influences his treatment of the more legalistic and institutional varieties of constitutional question. His response to complaints that the proposed government will exercise too many of the
most important governmental powers is, essentially, that people
should not oppose means that are necessary for ends that they
want."' In an important passage he recalls "the impious doctrine in
the old world that the people were made for kings, not kings for
the people," and he charges his states rights adversaries with reviving this old doctrine in a new shape. He finds the jealous concern
for state prerogatives tantamount to a suggestion that "the solid
happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political
institutions."1 9 In a statement that mitigates his own shortsighted
and even disingenuous predictions about the preservation of state
prerogatives and "the greater probability of encroachments" by the
states upon the central government, he acknowledges that such
"conjectures. . . must be extremely vague and fallible," and he all
but leaves the eventual balance between state and nation to popular assessment of which arrangement best serves the people's happiness.2 0 Publius's attitude is all the more remarkable because his
audience conceives a federal division of power as essential to a legitimate constitutional system. From the way he insists that the
concerns of states righters be translated into more fundamental
questions of means and ends, we are led to ask how else substance
overpowers institutional form in Publius's constitutional thought.
The answer is revealed quite plainly in Federalist 45, where
Publius states flatly that "the real welfare of the great body of the

15 See Federalist 15, in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 89, 91-92 (1961). All subse-

quent references to particular papers are to this edition.
16 Id. at 92.
17 See Federalist 6 at 28, Federalist 7 at 36, and Federalist 8 at 44.
18 Federalist 23 at 146, 146-48.
'9

Federalist 45 at 308, 309.

20 Federalist 31 at 193, 198. See also, Epstein, Political Theory of The Federalist52-54

(cited in note 12); Herbert J. Storing, The Problem of Big Government, in Robert A.
Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States 65 (1963).

1988]

Judicial Review and The Federalist

people is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of
Government whatever, has any other value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, reject the
plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness,
it would be, abolish the Union."21
This attitude pervades The Federalist;it surfaces in the discussion of each of its principal topics, from states' rights to the
general principles of representation and the separation of powers.
Thus, when Publius defends his proposal for a strong executive he
says that if "a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of
republican government," we must condemn not (as we might have
expected) a strong executive, but republican government. For a
"feeble executive" means "a bad government" in practice,
"whatever it may be in theory," and a bad government is indefensible.2 2 The overriding character of Publius's substantive commitment is evident also in Federalist10. There, he defines a "faction"
as a group whose demands are "adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." He declares majority faction to be the great problem of republican government, and he says that republican government is
not to be recommended unless it can "secure the public good, and
private rights, against. . . a [majority] faction."2 3 The primacy of
substance over institutional form is plain also in Federalist 51,
where Publius says: "Justice is the end of government. It is the end
of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it
be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society
under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may truly be said to reign, as in a
'24
state of nature.
To secure minority rights and the common good from majority
faction in a manner consistent with the forms of popular government, Publius proposes a plan that exhibits two general and complementary aims: (1) preventing the tyranny of any one segment of
the community over the others, and (2) providing governmental
"energy" both for effective legal sanctions and for identifying and
ameliorating social problems. Publius's plan for controlling the effects of faction, and majority faction in particular, is well known to
21 Federalist 45 at 308, 309.
22 Federalist 70 at 472.
2 Federalist 10 at 56, 57, 60-61.
24

Federalist 51 at 347, 352.
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the general reader through the most famous of the Federalist papers, Number 10. What is not as well known is Publius's argument
for responsible government. It is the latter that I emphasize in this
paper, for it houses his theory of the judiciary.
Publius starts by proposing a national government with power
to act directly on the large number of individuals and interest
groups that are to comprise the society.2 The legislature of this
government is designed to "refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens."26
The legislature is divided into houses whose "different modes of
election," tenure, function, and resulting institutional psychology
will divide and weaken the legislature as a whole. This arrangement makes majority faction less likely, in accord with the argument of Number 10. It also creates, through the weakening of the
legislature, one of the conditions for the independence of the executive, which would otherwise be a weaker branch in this as in other
popular governments.
The executive is designed to exercise the initiatives of government. The executive branch features a unitary organization conducive to decision and dispatch, an independent electoral base and
independent constitutional powers. Moreover, it has independent
means of support and defenses against legislative encroachment,
including the presidential veto and a constitutional prohibition
against diminution of salary.2"
It is important to note that the executive is designed to act
independently of Congress and even of public opinion for limited
periods of time. In a remarkable passage of Number 71, Publius
asserts that "[t]he republican principle demands" only that the
"deliberative sense of the community should govern the conduct"
of government. The republican principle "does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breese of passion, or to
every transient impulse" of public opinion.2 9 Publius believes the
people agree with this conception of republican government; "the
people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD," realize their capacity for error, and "despise the adulator, who should pretend that
they always reason right about the means of promoting" the pub"

See generally, Federalist 9 at 50, Federalist 10 at 56, Federalist 15 at 89, Federalist

51 at 347.
26 Federalist 10 at 56, 62.
2 Federalist 51 at 347, 350.
28 See generally, Federalist 69 at 462, Federalist 70 at 471, Federalist 71 at 481, Federalist 72 at 486, Federalist 73 at 492, Federalist 74 at 500.
28 Federalist 71 at 481, 482.
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lic good."0 Thus, when "the interests of the people are at variance
with their inclinations," persons appointed "the guardians of those
interests" have a "duty" to "withstand the temporary delusion" of
the people and "give them time and opportunity for more cool and
sedate reflection."3 1 Such conduct has on occasion "saved the people from . . . their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men, who had courage and magna3' 2
nimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.
Here, then, is a government that is prepared to be initially less
responsive to both public and legislative opinion so that it can be
more responsible in the long run-that is, so that it can achieve
objectives that the public ought to approve and can eventually approve. Publius outlines a more explicit conception of "responsible
government" in a section of Federalist63 that compares the Senate with the House of Representatives. "Responsibility in order to
be reasonable," he says, "must be limited to objects within the
power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must
relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper
judgement can be formed by the constituents."3 3 Because the size
of the House and the tenure of its members cause it to fall short of
the standards entailed by this view of responsible government-because, in other words, a body that is too responsive to too
many too often cannot be as responsible as a body that is not-the
government needs "an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures,
may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of
those objects."3 4
Then Publius says something about the Senate that prefigures
his views about "personal firmness" in the executive: "To a people
as little . . . corrupted by flattery" as those whom Publius addresses, he says that an institution like the Senate "may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions." Though "the cool and deliberate
sense of the community. . will in all free governments ultimately
prevail," "there are particular moments in public affairs" when
some "irregular passion" grips public opinion and "the people..

Id. at 482 (original emphasis).
Id. at 482-83.
32 Id. at 483.
11 Federalist 63 at 422, 424.
34 Id.
30
3!
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may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards...
lament and condemn." "In these critical moments" the people
need "some temperate and respectable body" to check public opinion "until reason, justice and truth, can regain their authority over
the public mind." Had the Athenians enjoyed "so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions," popular government might have escaped "the indelible reproach of decreeing to
the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the
next.""5
In these passages Publius suggests that responsibility in government is conditioned on a certain kind of power and a certain
kind of visibility: power to perform the tasks for which one is held
responsible (responsibility for something) and visibility sufficient
to be held responsible by others (responsibility to someone). Most
importantly, the tasks for which one is to be held responsible include controlling the individual and collective tendencies that
make government necessary in the first place. As Publius elsewhere
notes, human beings everywhere are "ambitious, vindictive and rapacious;"36 they are "much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other, than to co-operate for their common good."3 7 And because
human nature is what it is, those who found governments "must
first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the
next place, oblige it to controul itself." 8
III. THE TASK OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
An obvious problem with Publius's conception of responsibility in government is that its elements appear to conflict. The
power that a responsible government must have is power to be exercised against the inclinations of the governed themselves. Yet it
is the governed who, at the founding, will judge the propriety of
the power to be exercised; and, subsequent to the founding, they
will judge the actual exercises of that power. Resolution of this
paradox is to be found in Publius's distinction between the immediate inclinations of people and their long-range interests. We saw
this distinction at work in a passage on the executive's personal
firmness: "When . . . the interests of the people are at variance
with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they
have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand
35 Id. at 424-25.
3 Federalist 6 at 28.
'7 Federalist 10 at 56, 59.
'3 Federalist 51 at 347, 349.
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the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection."3 And when Publius defends the organization of the Senate he speaks of "some temperate
and respectable body of citizens" standing up to public opinion
"until reason, justice and truth, can regain their authority over the
public mind. ' 40 So Publius's idea is that, in the long run, the public will come to see the virtue of policies whose intrinsic value may
not have been evident at first. He is not saying, we should note,
that whatever might attract sustained public approval will for that
reason be in the public interest, for throughout he assumes objective criteria of justice, human rights, and common good. His commitment to democracy causes him to believe that a government of
the people can make the people aware of their objective interest.
Publius believes the case for popular government depends on its
reconciliation to objective standards.
Thus, he cannot recommend democracy unless he believes it
likely that the mass of the people will eventually support a government whose policies tend to satisfy objective criteria of justice,
human rights, and the common good. Eventually, his approach
calls for inquiry into the substance of those criteria, and elsewhere
I have defended a conception of the ideal state of affairs implicit in
the Constitution's arrangement of offices, powers and rights.4 1 In
general, I view this constitutional ideal as a commercial society
whose people enjoy as much personal and collective security as is
compatible with a strong commitment to individual and minority
rights, a commitment emanating from what is in effect a ruling desire to be, and be recognized as, a community of reasoning and
reasonable beings. 42 Yet this is not the place to elaborate any particular version of substantive constitutional values. I wish simply
to emphasize that objective criteria of some description are integral to Publius's purposes and enter into his general view of government's fundamental problems and methods. His aim, abstractly
stated, is a state of affairs in which a government initially rooted in
consent can pursue the common good while honoring individual
and minority rights, and his basic method is a government that is
insulated from popular reaction for a period of time sufficient to
change public opinion for the better without denying the public's
ultimate right to judge.
" Federalist 71 at 481, 482-83.
40 Federalist 63 at 422, 425.

"' Barber, On What the Constitution Means at 63-168 (cited in note 2).
42

Id.
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PUBLIUS AND THE JUDICIARY

A. The Broader Institutional Context
I shall return to Publius's view of responsible government, but
first let us see how the judiciary enters Publius's exposition of the
Constituttion's principles. The first extended reference to the judiciary occurs in Federalist 22, the last of a series of papers devoted
to a criticism of the Articles of Confederation. A principal theme of
the series is the Confederation's lack of energy, energy for enforcing sanctions for violations of law, and energy for identifying and
acting on society's problems. Federalist 15 begins the series; it focuses on those provisions of the Articles that require Congress to
raise revenues and troops by directing requisitions to the legislatures of the several states, rather than by passing laws directly
binding on indiv'dual citizens. Publius calls the Confederation's
method of raising money and troops through requisitions the
"principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS,
in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they con' What makes this defect such a serious one is that it transsist."43
forms what are nominally laws binding on the states into "mere
recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their
option."' 4 The states are free to obey or not because Congress is

politically and economically incapable of mustering the amount
and kind of force needed for effective sanctions upon entire states.
Legislation for states is the "parent of anarchy" whose only remedy is force on a scale that amounts to civil war, says Publius."
The Confederation's principle proceeds from "an ignorance of
the true springs" of human conduct because it assumes that "a
sense of common interest" can replace fear of sanctions as the
foundation for the general obedience to law. The defenders of the
Confederation ignore "the original inducements to the establishment of civil power," that "the passions of men will not conform to
the dictates of reason and justice without constraint." 4 1 They also

ignore a natural jealousy of power "that disposes those who are
invested with . . . it, to look with an evil eye upon all external

attempts to restrain or direct its operations." This jealousy gives
an "excentric tendency" to all political associations "formed upon
"1

Federalist 15 at 89, 93.

44 Id.
41
46

Federalist 16 at 99.
Federalist 15 at 89, 96.
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the principle of uniting. . . a number of lesser sovereignties." And
this eccentric tendency leaves little prospect that the laws of the
union will be executed at all if entrusted to the states. 7 The laws
of the union should apply directly to individuals, for individuals
alone are amenable to coercion by the civil magistracies; coercing
whole states requires military force, or civil war.4 8
In the next several papers Publius shifts his emphasis to the
potential danger to the states of a central government continually
faced with the choice of disintegration or military force. He offers
examples from the histories of ancient confederations to support
his point that the principle of legislation for states is at once the
parent of anarchy and tyranny.4 9 And he concludes with the "important truth" that as "legislation for communities" is a "solecism
in theory; so in practice, it is subversive of the order and ends of
civil polity, by substituting violence . . . in place of the mild and
' ' 50
salutary coertion of the magistracy.
Such is the background for Publius's comment in Number 22
on "[a] circumstance, which crowns the defects of the confederation. . .- the want of a judiciary power." "[W]ithout courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation," says Publius,
"[laws are a dead letter." To courts belong the duty to ascertain
the "true import" of treaties and "all other laws" "as far as respects individuals." And since "[t]here are endless diversities" of
opinion among judges regarding the meaning of laws-"[w]e often
see not only different courts, but the Judges of the same court differing from each other"-"al nations have found it necessary to
establish one court paramount to the rest." This one court possesses "a general superintendance . . . and . . . settle[s] and
de'51
clare[s] in the last resort, an uniform rule of civil justice."
Publius believes that one paramount court is especially necessary in a federal system because he takes it as a general proposition of political behavior that men in office naturally look "towards
that authority to which they owe their official existence." Without
a supreme national tribunal, conflict between local systems would
compound the inevitable "contradictions . . . from difference of
opinion" between judges of the same system; "there will be much
to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices and from the

4 Id. at 96-97.
4 Id. at 95-96.
4' See Federalist 17-20.

Federalist 20 at 124, 128-29 (original emphasis).
51Federalist 22 at 135, 143-44.
60
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interference of local regulations" with "the general laws." Such a
situation obtains with respect to the construction of treaties under
the Articles, and "[t]he faith, the reputation, the peace of the
whole union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices,
the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed." In exasperation, Publius asks: "Is it possible that the People of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?" 2
From the perspective of the debates in the twentieth century
over the nature, scope, and legitimacy of judicial power, one of the
remarkable things about these statements from Federalist22 is the
ease with which Publius expresses his view that independent
judges should ascertain the "true import" of the law, while taking
for granted the inevitable controversies concerning the meaning of
the law. Publius says these controversies originate in the "endless
diversities in the opinions of men" and the tendency of individual
judges to favor "that authority to which they owe their official existence." This tendency is particularly significant in a federal republic, for if we granted the proposition that explains Publius's
prediction that state judges will, if permitted, tend to favor state
authority, we would expect a nationalist bias among federal judges.
Publius thus sees no contradiction between a willingness to entrust
the nation's judges with the quest of the law's true meaning and an
expectation of both inevitable controversies over meaning and a
nationalistic bias among federal judges.
Further evidence that Publius admits the possibility of true
meaning in the face of controversy is available wherever he himself
takes a position on a matter of legal-moral controversy. Federalist
1 affords as telling an instance as any. Here he says Americans may
be in a position to decide for the whole of mankind the possibility
of establishing "good government from reflection and choice." He
exhorts them to "choice[s] . . .directed by a judicious estimate of
our true interests, unperplexed and unbiassed by considerations
not connected with the public good." And he says these things notwithstanding his belief that an objective decision with regard to
ratification "is more ardently to be wished, than seriously to be
expected," since the proposed constitution "affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to
involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits,
and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discov-

" Id. at 144.

1988]

Judicial Review and The Federalist

ery of truth."53
In this statement Publius presupposes an objective view of the
merits of the constitutional proposal despite his recognition of the
obstacles to achieving such a view. He therefore proceeds to offer
his arguments to all "in a spirit[] which will not disgrace the cause
of truth. 5 4 He urges his readers to moderation, toleration, and reflection by observing that "the causes which serve to give a false
bias to the judgment" are "so powerful" that we find many "wise
and good men" on both sides of many important questions.5 5 He
proceeds, in other words, on the assumption that a process of
open-minded and self-critical striving can raise an individual and a
community of individuals above parochialism and prejudice toward
a true understanding of the common good. Since this assumption is
itself part of the background of every other argument of The Federalist, literally every significant thought of that work is evidence
for the proposition that Publius believes controversy does not preclude true meaning.
As evidence for Publius's further belief that a nationalist bias
inclines federal officials toward an objective grasp of what the Constitution means, consider Publius's theory of checks and balances,
the very heart of his theory of constitutional maintenance. In that
theory Publius makes plain his belief that an official's personal
ambition can coincide with official duty, as defined by a scheme
proceeding from a true understanding of the common good. Assuming that the Constitution is such a scheme, then regardless of
one's motivation, performing duties that the Constitution
prescribes is acting as one would act if one were moved by a devotion to the common good. Publius can reconcile his pessimistic
view of human nature with his belief that constitutional duties
serve the public interest if he can somehow harness self-serving
ambition to duty. He claims to have done just this, of course, when
he says in Federalist 51 that "the great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected
56
with the constitutional rights of the place. 1

53 Federalist 1 at 1, 3-4.
54 Id. at 6.

15 Id. at 4.
51 Federalist 51 at 347, 349.
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Publius's theory of checks and balances can explain how he
might rely on a nationalist bias among federal judges and others. It
also explains some of the institutional conditions necessary to provide for leadership that is more than simply biased. The theory of
checks and balances is Publius's answer to a question that appears
initially in Federalist47: On what are we to rely "for maintaining
in practice the separation [of powers] delineated on paper?

' 57

In

Numbers 48 through 50, he rejects several alternative answers for
reasons that have important implications for the argument he will
eventually make in favor of judicial review. I shall review Publius's
analysis briefly.
In Federalist48, he dismisses what is perhaps the first proposal one might suggest as a means to maintain the separation of
powers: "mark with precision the boundaries of these departments
in the Constitution of the government." His well known response
to this proposal is that "parchment barriers" will not work
"against the encroaching spirit of power." Means more effective
than mere words are needed to defend the "feeble, against the
more powerful members of the government." And in "our republics" it is the legislature that is "every where extending the sphere
of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." 58
To corroborate his fear of legislative encroachments Publius
invokes the testimony of Jefferson and the Pennsylvania Council
of Censors. Both criticize legislative acts that, in Jefferson's words,
"should have been left to judiciary controversy. ' 59 Publius feels

that the legislature of a representative democracy is particularly
dangerous because it is a more competent body than the deliberative assembly of a direct democracy. Unlike the latter, the former
is "sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a
multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the
objects of its passions." 60 So the message of Number 48 is that the
nation cannot hope to maintain the constitutional arrangement of
offices and powers by relying on the inadequate degree of devotion
to law that is typical of representative legislatures.
From Publius's account it would appear that the legislature's
responsiveness to public opinion is the cause of the legislature's
tendency to disregard constitutional limitations. Publius makes his
distrust of public opinion explicit in the next number of The FedFederalist 47 at 323, 331.
Federalist 48 at 332, 332-33.
Id. at 335-36, quoting Notes on the State of Virginia at 195 (original emphasis).
60 Id. at 334.
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eralist, where the subject is Jefferson's proposal, submitted for inclusion in the Virginia constitution, that any two branches of government could call a convention of the people to correct
constitutional violations of the third branch.6 Although Publius
criticizes this proposal, he begins by acknowledging that "the people are the only legitimate fountain of power" and that "[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate . . . neither of them
. . . can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the
boundaries between their respective powers." From this it follows
that some "constitutional road to the decision of the people, ought
to be marked out, and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions.""
But Publius then offers objections to Jefferson's specific proposal that bear unflattering implications for public opinion. Frequent appeals to the people would undermine the veneration for
the constitution upon which the stability even of the "wisest and
freest governments" depends. Frequent referrals of constitutional
questions to the people will disturb "the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions."6 3 He says the people,
because of their close connection with it, will usually favor the legislature over the other branches. They will rarely favor a judiciary
whose appointment, tenure, and functions render it "too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. ''
And though a popular executive might cause temporary reversals
of the normal pattern, the people's decision
could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the
question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of
pre-existing parties, or of parties springing out of the question
itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished
character and extensive influence in the community. It would
be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or
opponents of the measures, to which the decision would relate. The passions therefore not the reason, of the public,
would sit in judgement. But it is the reason of the public
alone that ought to controul and regulate the government.
The passions ought to be controuled and regulated by the

6' See Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (May-June 1783), in Julian P.
Boyd, ed., 6 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 294 (1952).
62Federalist 49 at 338, 339.
6' Id. at 340.
6'Id. at 341.
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government.6 5
Of the institutions mentioned in Federalist49-the electorate,
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and the Constitution-Publius associates the judiciary and the Constitution with
"the reason . . . of the public." In his thinking, public opinion
more often expresses the "passions" of the public, passions which
"ought to be controuled and regulated by the government." And
public opinion is normally closer to legislative opinion than to executive and judicial opinion.
Open distrust of public opinion cannot be a comfortable position for Publius, a republican statesman conducting a ratification
campaign for the public's approval. Publius must explain the
anomaly of entrusting the public with the more basic and demanding task of ratification but not with the relatively routine tasks of
constitutional maintenance. His explanation is that there is something special about the founding generation. Unlike the subsequent
generations to whom would fall the responsibility of constitutional
maintenance, the ratifying or founding generation is the generation
of the Revolution. Revolutionary pressures on the founding generation bring dangers and opportunities that inspire popular confidence in patriotic leaders and repress "the passions most unfriendly to order and concord."6 When normalcy returns, says
Publius, partisan passions will reoccupy their usual position of influence with most people. In normal times, the institution least
susceptible to partisan passions will be the judiciary.
What about appeals to the people not just during times of crisis, but at regular intervals? Federalist50 rejects this modification
of Jefferson's proposal, arguing that factionalism is likely to affect
popular deliberations at any time that does not produce "either a
universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of
liberty. ' 67 Publius then advances the familiar proposal of Federalist 51: instead of relying on the virtue of citizens and officials, the
nation should rely on checks and balances for maintaining the separation of powers.
Because the defense of each branch of the government "must
• . . be made commensurate to the danger" of encroachment from
the others, and because Publius believes that in our political culture there is more to fear from the legislature than other branches,
" Id. at 342-43 (original emphasis).
6 Id. at 341.
Federalist 50 at 343, 346.
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Federalist51 deliberately weakens the legislative branch by dividing it into two houses, "render[ing] them by different modes of
election, and different principles of action, as little connected with
each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their
common dependence on the society, will admit." Publius adds that
as the strength of the legislature requires that it should be weakened, "the weakness of the executive may require . . . that it
should be fortified."6 8 Publius mentions the veto as one of the executive's methods of defense along with "some qualified connection
between this weaker department, and the weaker branch of the
stronger department. '69 Publius thus employs an institution's relative responsiveness to public opinion as the measure of its inherent
strength. He then proposes constitutional provisions that will alter
the inherent strength of the institution. In this manner, Publius
seeks to weaken the inherently stronger and strengthen the inherently weaker. In FederalistNumbers 67 through 77 he elaborates
additional ways of strengthening the executive branch. A most revealing part of his discussion of the executive is the passage I have
cited above concerning a four-year term of office and the executive's "personal firmness." Publius considers such firmness essential to a plan that would promote the triumph of the public's real
"interests" over its temporary "inclinations. 7 0 Four paragraphs
later, he raises the question "whether a duration of four years
would answer the end proposed." He admits that neither four
years nor "any other limited duration" will serve the purpose completely, though he seems prepared to accept the four year term as
a concession to democratic fears of executive power. 1
B. The Constitution of Judicial Power
Publius's views on the presidency and its complex relationship
to public opinion are important for understanding his views on the
judiciary. The latter follow the papers on the presidency, and as
with the presidency, Publius's proposals for the judiciary aim at
strengthening what would otherwise be a weak institution. Upon
turning to the judiciary, he first defends a life tenure for federal
judges, and the principle he employs is the same as in his defense
of the tenure for senators and presidents: duration in office en-

" Federalist

51 at 347, 349-50.

69 Id.
70

Federalist 71 at 481, 484-85.

71 Id. at 484-85.
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hances an institution's independence and firmness. 72 We should recall that this principle reflects both his pessimism about the deliberative and moral qualities of public opinion, and a conception of
governmental responsibility that involves power to stand up to
public opinion in the service of ends-the common good and the
protection of individual and minority rights-whose worthiness
and content are independent of public opinion. Thus, Publius
notes the "natural feebleness of the judiciary" and its "continual
jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its coordinate branches." And since "nothing can contribute so much to its
firmness and independence, as permanency in office," permanency
is an "indispensable ingredient" in the judiciary's constitution, "in
a great measure.
' 73
security.

. .

the citadel of the public justice and the public

Publius then elaborates the extent and objectives of judicial
power. He recognizes a judicial "duty. . . to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. 7' 4 This func-

tion is "peculiarly essential in a limited constitution" because it is
the only practical way to enforce "specified exceptions to the legislative authority."" 5 In a statement that closely parallels his arguments on the firmness of the Senate and the executive, Publius
construes the power of judicial review as power to oppose public as
well as legislative opinion. As with the Senate and the executive,
he seems to regard a strong and independent judiciary partly as an
instrument for educating the public. This is the suggestion of his
statement that judicial independence is "requisite to guard the
constitution and the rights of individuals from the. . . ill humours
. . . [of] the people themselves, and which, though they speedily

give place to better information and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency in the mean time to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor
party in the community. '76 Though he reassures his readers of his
commitment to republican principles, including "the right of the
people to alter or abolish the established constitution whenever
they find it inconsistent with their happiness," he denies that this
implies a right to violate the Constitution "whenever a momentary
inclination happens to lay hold of a majority." He denies that
11 Federalist 78 at 521, 529.
Id. at 523-24.
7 Id. at 524.
7

75

Id.

76

Id. at 527.
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courts should "connive at infractions" supported by public opinion
any more than infractions proceeding "wholly from the cabals of
the representative body." "Until. . . some solemn and authoritative act," like amendment or revolution, has "annulled or changed
the established form, it is binding upon" the people and their representatives. "But it is easy to see that it would require an uncommon. .. fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been
instigated by the major voice of the community. 7 7 So Publius sets
out to provide the conditions for the requisite judicial fortitude.
As for the scope of judicial review, Publius does not regard
expressed constitutional provisions as the sole source of standards
for exercises of judicial power. Publius apparently believes that a
government will occasionally act unjustly, though within its sphere
of competence and in a manner beyond the full reach of courts.
When judges have no choice but to live with such unjust laws,
Publius says judicial independence will enable judges to construe
laws in ways that mitigate injustice. Publius thus defends a power
of therapeutic construction-a duty to select interpretive options
closest not to legislative intent but what simple justice would require. 7 1 He goes on to recognize that the very existence of this
power in the courts should serve to inhibit legislatures that plan
79
injustice.
Publius concludes this part of his discussion of judicial tenure
with a clear statement of approval for the way independence can
help transform a weak institution into one strong enough to maintain uncompromising opposition to unconstitutional public and
legislative preferences. Thus he holds "inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution and of individuals" to be
"indispensable in the courts of justice." And he says that such
firmness "can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their
offices by a temporary commission." Foreclosing any suggestion of
judicial deference to others, Publius says that periodic judicial appointments would mean "an improper complaisance" to the legislature, or to the executive, or to both, or to the people-and thus
would create "too great a disposition to consult popularity" rather
than "the constitution and the laws." 0
77 Id. at 527-28.

7' See Posner, 59 Ind.L.J. at 5 (cited in note 6).
7' Federalist 78 at 521, 528 (cited in note
15).
80 Id. at 529.
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A Judicial Monopoly of Constitutional Interpretation?

Publius's argument for judicial review lends itself to a construction we may ultimately want to reject, namely, that judges apply the Constitution not only for concrete controversies before the
courts, but also for the future decisions of the other branches of
the government."' In other words, Publius may imply that the judiciary will monopolize the general function of determining what the
Constitution means. Several considerations favor this generous
construction of Publius's argument. To begin with, we have seen
him suggest that responsiveness to public opinion is inversely related to firmness on behalf of minority rights and long range public
objectives.8 2 He says, in addition, that as compared to other officials, judges must be persons of more learning, because of the volume of precedents to be mastered, and more integrity, because of
their expected firmness in support of principle.8 3 He is pessimistic
about the states' fidelity to "the articles of union," and he conceives judicial review as a substitute for congressional power to
veto state acts. 4 This implies that judicial precedents can function
as rules for legislative conduct and that courts can interpret the
Constitution for the other branches.
Moreover, in Federalist 80 Publius treats as virtually self-evident the propriety of the grant in Article III, § 2 of federal jurisdiction over federal questions: "The mere necessity of uniformity
in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question.
Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction . . . is a hydra
. . .from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed. '8 5 Since contradiction and confusion might also proceed from
a plurality of interpretations among the branches of the national
government, this passage adds to the case for judicial monopoly at
both the national and federal levels. Finally, in Federalist81, Publius defends the decision not to give Congress power to review judicial decisions, arguing that judicial encroachments will be rare and
relatively inconsequential, and that Congress's power to impeach
81 For recent challenges to this presumed judicial monopoly, see John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy (1984); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution"
in American Civil Religion, 1979 S.Ct.Rev. 123; Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?
The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 Rev.of Pol. 401 (1986).
" Federalist 49 at 338, 341-42; Federalist 63 at 422, 423-25; Federalist 71 at 481, 481-84
(cited in note 15).
" Federalist 51 at 347, 348; Federalist 78 at 521, 529-30; Federalist 81 at 541, 543-44.
"' Federalist 80 at 534, 535.
85 Id. at 535.
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"is alone a complete security." 8
Despite Publius's emphasis on judicial competence, relative fidelity to the Constitution, and the value of uniformity, a closer
look at these and other considerations suggests that Publius would
allow limited concessions to a pluralistic view of who should interpret the Constitution. Admittedly, Publius insists on judicial independence and firmness in cases before the courts, 7 and this independence alone should give the judiciary's interpretations of the
Constitution great strategic advantage over other interpretations
as long as the courts remain within a range of tolerable alternatives. 8 The question, therefore, is not so much whether other
branches can normally ignore judicial interpretations, but whether
they ever have constitutional warrant deliberately to undermine
the precedential value of judicial decisions. The power to impeach
cannot preclude a pluralist approach, for by referring to impeachment as a remedy for "deliberate usurpations," not mere legislative
disapproval,8 9 Publius implies that the legislature has some independent power to decide what the Constitution means. Thus, the
advantages of national supremacy and uniformity in interpretation
need not imply a judicial monopoly.
The strongest argument for a judicial monopoly of constitutional interpretation proceeds from the premise of special judicial
competence. I have discussed Publius's pessimism about the public's commitment to constitutional principle in normal times. In
setting the stage for his theory of checks and balances, Publius observes that their tenure and method of appointment will render
judges less responsive to popular prejudices than the elected
branches will be.90 His conception of governmental responsibility
leads him to emphasize that some insulation from electoral pressure is essential to good government, and he doubts that four years
or "any other limited duration" will suffice for executives to educate the public to its true interests-a result on which he expressly
conditions his very support of popular government. 1 His central
themes all flow from his basic project to reconcile popular govern81Federalist

81 at 541, 545-46.

81 Id. at 545.

8s See Federalist 79 at 531, 532-33 (arguing that impeachment is the only method for
removing judges compatible with judicial independence, and opposing provision for removal
"on account of inability," though conceding that "insanity" is a disqualification).
8* Federalist 81 at 541, 545-46.
8oFederalist 49 at 338, 341.
"
See Federalist 71 at 481, 484-5. For similar discussion, see Federalist 63 at 422, 425.
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ment to minority rights and the common good.9 2 And because responsiveness to the public's more immediate inclinations obscures
the practical meaning of these values, Publius cannot expect the
elected branches to be as competent as the courts in discerning
these values.
As we have also seen, Publius does recognize that judges can
usurp. Impeachment is the remedy he proposes. He considers impeachment "the only provision . . . which is consistent with the
necessary independence of the judicial character." 93 Furthermore,
he either ignores or, in view of his emphasis on judicial independence, excludes the potential check of Congress's power to establish the lower federal courts and regulate the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. 4 We can therefore read him to suggest that
when the elected branches disapprove of what the judges say, their
recourse is replacing irresponsible judges with responsible ones.
Such a check would still leave constitutional interpretation largely
in the hands of the courts.
On the other hand, Publius insists that judicial independence
is not the same thing as judicial superiority over the other
branches.9 He also seems to assume that judges should remain
sensible of the independence of the other branches-in particular,
with regard to their freedom to refuse cooperation with judicial decision, at least in extraordinary circumstances. Thus Publius acknowledges the judiciary's dependence on the executive more than
once 9 6 and this at least suggests that there is no necessary inconsistency between refusals to cooperate with judges in some instances
and a more general respect for judicial independence.
Publius's clear support for a strong judiciary flows from his
central objective of reconciling popular government to higher standards. He implies that those standards are not of the judges's own
making by his famous statement that the judiciary's power is
"neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment. ' 97 By acknowledging objective standards of judgment and the judiciary's partial dependence on others, Publius's theory lends itself to a construction
that permits other branches some power to decide the constitutionality of their own acts. The mere possibility of such a construcSee Federalist 9 at 50, 51; Federalist 10 at 56, 61; Federalist 51 at 347, 352.
"' Federalist 79 at 531, 533; see also Federalist 81 at 541, 545-46.
9' For Publius's discussion of the "exceptions" clause, see Federalist 80 at 534, 541;
Federalist 81 at 541, 551-52.
" Federalist 78 at 521, 525. See also Federalist 49 at 338, 339.
9' Federalist 78 at 521, 523; Federalist 81 at 541, 545.
'7 Federalist 78 at 521, 523.
9
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tion is of course not a sufficient argument for it, and because I
have made that argument elsewhere,9 8 I will not dwell on the matter here. My point is that Publius can be read as acknowledging
the possibility of judicial error and accepting other branches' opposition to judicial constructions without displacing judicial power to
decide concrete cases and controversies. The broader influence of a
judiciary thus confined might depend to a greater extent than is
presently the case on the persuasiveness of the Supreme Court's
arguments.9"
V.

PUBLIUS's DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL REvmw

The defense of judicial review in Federalist78 is comprised of
three propositions: (1) judicial review does not amount to judicial
supremacy, (2) judicial review is instead an expression of constitutional supremacy, and (3) constitutional supremacy ensures the
supremacy of the people over their government. 100
The first thing to notice about Publius's argument is its defensive character, which derives from the fact that it is addressed to
an audience with a democratic outlook. Publius to some extent accepts the leading assumption of his critics over the years: judicial
review would be illegitimate if it in fact did lead to the supremacy
of electorally unaccountable judges. He also seems to concede his
opposition's view of the appearances: a power to declare the legislature's acts unconstitutional does suggest judicial supremacy. It
thus falls on defenders of judicial review to show that, despite the
appearances, judicial review does not amount to judicial
supremacy. If advocates of judicial review cannot make that showing, then the appearances will stand and will condemn judicial review as illegitimate.
According to Publius, then, judicial review does not amount to
judicial supremacy; it is an instrument of constitutional supremacy
that insures the people's supremacy over government. The mediating concept of this argument, the term that connects the judges
and the people, is the Constitution. Judicial review implies constitutional supremacy, and constitutionalsupremacy implies popular
supremacy.
The key presuppositions of this argument concern the psychology of judges in constitutional cases, the semantic qualities of

"

Barber, On What the Constitution Means at 197-98, 216-18 (cited in note 2).

See Murphy, 48 Rev. of Pol. at 408, 417 (cited in note 81).
,oo Federalist 78 at 521, 525 (cited in note 15).
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constitutional values from one generation to the next, and the
ontological status of those values. A rough outline of the basic alternatives and presuppositions of Publius's argument follows:
Judicial Review implies either
I. Judicial Supremacy, or
II. A. Constitutional Supremacy, which in turn implies
B. Popular Supremacy.
That it implies II.A. (constitutional supremacy) presupposes
1. That judges are psycholigically capable of repressing their
personal predilections in favor of what the Constitution
means; and
2. That constitutional language is adequate to the communication of meaning in concrete cases.
That it implies II.B (popular supremacy) presupposes
1. That fundamental constitutional values can in fact be
transmitted from generation to generation; and
2. That because of their objective validity and transhistorical
applicability, fundamental constitutional values are worth
transmitting from one generation to the next.
I shall further explicate Publius's defense of judicial review by discussing each of its presuppositions.
II.A.1. The Possibility of Dutiful Judicial Decision.
The leading psychological presupposition of Publius's argument is simply that it is possible for judges to decide cases in a
manner that is faithful to the law. This presupposition has, of
course, long been controversial as a result of the legal realist theories of writers like Holmes, Frank, and Arnold.1 01 On the other
hand, important recent theories affirm the possibility of dutiful judicial performance, even in hard cases. 02 Settling this issue forms
no part of my purpose here. What is relevant is the apparent paradox of Publius's assuming the possibility of judicial duty in the
face of his own well known skepticism about the likelihood of law
abiding officials generally, as well as the clear suggestion in other
parts of The Federalistthat judging constitutional questions is not
a mechanical process free of controversy. In defending judicial review, Publius may rely on an understanding of duty under law that
much of his earlier skepticism directly undermines.
101See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory 79-94 (1973).
102 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 80-130 (1977); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S.Cal.L.Rev. 151 (1981); Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978).
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Yet it would be a mistake to oversimplify Publius's view of
human psychology. From the beginning of his argument in Federalist 1,103 he expressly appeals to (and therefore presupposes) the
influence both of self interest and public spiritedness or virtue.
When, in Federalist10, he defines "faction" as either a minority or
a majority adverse to the rights of others and the common good,
and, more generally, when he proposes a plan for reconciling democracy to higher standards of political morality, he assumes that
his democratic audience is sufficiently virtuous to respond appropriately to such distinctions and prospects.
In Federalist 49, as we have seen, he does observe that normalcy diminishes virtue's influence and that it is the Revolution's
lingering impact that explains the relative virtue of his generation.
But he also believes that even in normal times the method of appointing judges and the functions they perform will diminish the
judiciary's share in the people's presuppositions."" And throughout his discussion of judicial appointment and tenure, Publius
aims at elevating and insulating the few then in society who can
"unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge" to be
federal judges."0 5
Publius can go so far as to defend judicial review even though
he recognizes that, despite all constitutional precautions, judges
may "substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions
of the legislature." 10 6 We have seen that his general approach to
constitutional maintenance involves linking officials' personal ambitions to what he expects of their offices. Self interested individuals will thus seek to aggrandize their offices, ambition will check
ambition, and in some sufficient respects, all will act not strictly
01 On the principle
from duty but as if motivated by duty.0
that
men in office naturally look up to "that authority to which they
owe their official existence," Publius opposes leaving federal questions to state judges, who can be expected to act "from the bias of
local views and prejudices" at the expense "of the general laws."' 8
And, as I have argued above, he can defend a nationalist bias in
federal judges if he believes, as he does, that the national government is best suited for realizing the proper ends of government.
103 Federalist

1 at 3, 3-4 (cited in note 15).
10 Federalist 49 at 338, 341.
,01 Federalist 78 at 521, 529-30.
106 Id. at 526.
107 Federalist 51 at 347, 349.
108 Federalist 22 at 135, 144.
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One could view the modern court's incorporation of the first
eight amendments into the fourteenth amendment as an example
of this national bias at work. By aggrandizing national judicial
power at the expense of the states, the explanation would go, the
federal courts advanced a culture of liberal toleration that all reasonable persons would approve if they were in a position to reason
aright. I need not evaluate this suggestion here. The point is that
material in The Federalist suggests both that judges can be motivated by duty and that even when they are not motivated by duty,
it is possible for personal or political ambition to be connected
with patterns of decision that the dutiful would favor.
II.A.2. The Clarity of ConstitutionalLanguage.
When Publius contends that judicial review implies constitutional supremacy, not judicial supremacy, he also presupposes that
the language of the Constitution has sufficient communicative
power to point judges toward the law and away from those of their
predilections that do not coincide with the law. He assumes that
the Constitution has a meaning independent of any particular
preferences and that persons of particular biases can grasp that
meaning. These assumptions are of course linked to his belief that
judges can do their duty. Assumptions regarding constitutional
meaning are manifest in his statements that "[a] constitution is in
fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law,"
that "interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts," and that in declaring "the sense of the law" judges
should be disposed to exercise judgment, not will.1" 9 Clearly, the
notion of decision under law presupposes the law's capacity to
communicate prescriptions contrary to at least some of the inclinations of persons whom the law would instruct or to whom the law
would apply. And Publius's defense of judicial review seeks to assure his audience that judges are likely to treat the Constitution as
law applicable to themselves as well as to others.
It may surprise us to see Publius's confidence coexist with his
appreciation of the controversial character of constitutional meaning. But in Publius's thought, adequacy of constitutional communication cannot imply the elimination of controversy and judgment
in the quest for the Constitution's practical implications. Though
Federalist 78 refers to the judicial function in terms of judgment
as opposed to will, the distinction does not imply that judgment is
1*oFederalist 78 at 521, 525-26.
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mechanical. Construed with the bulk of other things that he says
on the subject, judicial judgment instead manifests an attitude of
thoughtful concern for principled choice among debatable alternatives-decision that is not willful in the sense of "connected with
the spirit of preexisting parties, or of parties springing out of the
question itself."110 Thus, we have seen him propose final appellate
power over federal questions in "one SUPREME TRIBUNAL" as
a way of compensating for what he acknowledges to be "endless
diversities" over the meaning of the law; one, final authority makes
sense because of the endless controversy."" Yet he refers in the
same place to the "true meaning and operation" of the law as
something judges must "expound and define, 1"

2

and it is not likely

he would use these terms to describe self-evident meaning. Later,
in a passage already quoted, he uses the term "discretion" to describe judicial duty in the presence of conflicting laws, even though
maxims of interpretation provide some guidance to specific kinds
of conflict."'
Publius thus distinguishes "judgment" from "will" without
pretending that judicial decision can be something mechanical or
free of controversy. How should we react to this fact? Many commentators eschew formulating a theory of decision under law that
would reconcile the familiar reality of judicial discretion with the
political principle that would limit judicial discretion. Instead, they
assume that, because no test can resolve the controversy over interpretive options, decisions can only register the personal preferences of decision makers. In short, they believe that where controversy remains reasonable, the political preferences of judges are
the decisive factors.
Publius seems to have a different view, for he argues that
judges can be expected to exercise judgment, not will, at the same
time that he accepts the fact of continuing controversy over the
meaning of laws. We need not conclude that these elements of
1"0

Federalist 50 at 338, 342.

"I Federalist 22 at 135, 143 (original emphasis).
112

Id.

,13Federalist 78 at 521, 525-26. These maxims would include the preference for fundamental laws, like the Constitution, over ordinary legislation and the preference for later over
earlier legislation. Such rules of interpretation are "not derived from any positive law," says
Publius, "but from the nature and reason of the thing." Id. at 526. Similarly, "reason and
law conspire to dictate": that courts should try to reconcile conflicting statutes "[s]o far as
they can, by any fair construction." Id. at 525-26. Publius continues to expect disagreement
over the meaning of the law when he later returns to his recommendation that federal
courts have jurisdiction over federal questions and certain other kinds of controversy. Federalist 80 at 534, 534-35.
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Publius's view are incompatible. To render Publius coherent, we
need not embrace theories of The Federalistthat exclude one element or the other, for modern jurisprudence has produced theories
of judicial decision that claim to reconcile the realities of judicial
discretion with the value of decision under law.
Dworkin was the first contemporary legal theorist to defend a
way to reconcile judicial discretion with the rule of law. He interprets normal judicial controversy over the practical meaning of abstract normative ideas as disputation over concrete "conceptions,"
not general "concepts." When judges proceed in good faith, the
discretion involved in such controversies is an unobjectionable
"weak discretion," rather than the "strong discretion" that offends
our traditional sense of judgment under law. When judges exercise
weak discretion, they quest in a responsible and self-critical way
for the best available argument of legal principle; they try to avoid
mere rationalizations of partisan preferences.""
In mentioning Dworkin's theory as a way of explaining Publius's thought, I am not trying to impose an external order on Publius's beliefs. Dworkin is but one of several contemporary theorists
who claim to account for the way ordinary lawyers, judges, and citizens generally think about legal-moral controversies and decisions.
Another such theorist is Michael Moore. Moore maintains that ordinary men and women (and academics too, despite their disclaimers) take seriously the real existence of values like justice. Moore
concludes that the true nature of these values is important to us.
He argues that we pursue their nature not through stipulating or
reporting conventional definitions or examples, which are always
defeasible in light of what we take to be the real standards themselves, but through what we hope will be progressively better theo115
ries of the real ideas.
Moore's "moral realist" (as opposed to "moral conventionalist") account both fits and justifies Publius's well known avoidance
of attempts to reduce general normative ideas to clear definitions
and examples." 6 To mention well discussed examples, Federalist
10 leaves undefined such notions as "the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community," and Federalist 84 cautions against
any attempt to specify a finite number of constitutional rights.
Lack of definition and specification hardly inhibits Publius's use of
..
4 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 31-39, 136-37 (cited in note 102).
Moore, 58 S.Cal.L.Rev at 288-338, 371, 379-81, 393-96 (cited in note 4).
ni See White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution at 194 (cited in note

"
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normative terms; he seems to take for granted that his readers
have an idea of what he is talking about. Such moral realist assumptions are evident throughout his work. Perhaps the clearest
evidence is his statement in Federalist51 that "Justice is the end
of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and
ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in
the pursuit.' 1 17 And, of course, the constitutional document Pub-

lius proposes neither defines nor illustrates its normative terms.
On its face, the document and its amendments refer to ideas like
free speech and due process, not this or that version of such ideas.
Publius's philosophic realism is evident also in the account he
gives in Federalist37 of one of the difficulties faced by the constitutional convention: the "arduous

. .

.task of marking the proper

line" between the powers of the national and state governments.
Publius treats this task as akin to the attempts by "metaphysical
Philosophers" to "distinguish.

.

.and define.

.

., with satisfactory

precision" such objects as "[t]he faculti[es] of the mind" (for example, "perception, judgment, desire") and the "great kingdoms of
nature" (for example, "vegetable life," "unorganized matter," "the
animal empire"). Though these distinctions have eluded the "most
sagacious and laborious" efforts, they remain "pregnant source[s]
of ingenious disquisition and controversy.""' The fact that Publius
accepts the value of continuing controversy and experiment in
both the natural and social spheres suggests that Publius entertains the philosophically realist assumptions of everyday life.
Publius thus goes on to say that although nature's own "delineations are perfectly accurate" in themselves, they "appear to be
otherwise only from the imperfections of the eye which surveys
them." When it comes to "the institutions of man," on the other
hand, "obscurity arises as well from the object itself, as from the
organ by which it is contemplated." Hence, "no skill in the science
of Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary." Nor have the "continued and combined labors of the most enlightened Legislators and jurists" been successful "in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes
of laws and different tribunals of justice." Though Britain has pursued these matters "more industriously" than other nations, the
"jurisdiction of her several courts

"
18

. . .

Federalist 51 at 347, 352 (cited in note 15).
Federalist 37 at 231, 234-35.

is not less a source of fre-
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quent and intricate discussions.""' 9
Compounding "the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties" is the "cloudy medium" of language
through which "ideas" are communicated. 2 0 Yet Publius assumes
the ideas themselves exist independently of the words that would
pick them out when he says, "no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not
to include many equivocally denoting different ideas[,] . . . how2
ever accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves.' 1

And when he praises such things as recent improvements in "[tihe
science of politics" and "most other sciences,"' 22 the American love
of political innovation and experiment in general, 2 3 and the Convention's intellectual and moral virtues, 24 he takes for granted the
possibility and the value of improing our knowledge of a complex
reality in the face of human imperfections and inveterate
controversy.
This is not the place to defend Publius's philosophic assumptions. I mention them in connection with Moore and Dworkin only
to show that contemporary philosophy supplies us with theories
that purport to account for the everyday assumptions of ordinary
men and women that it is possible to avoid willful impositions in
our attempts to resolve controversies over the practical implications of general normative ideas. 125 Until we manage to escape

these ordinary presuppositions by persuasively answering Moore's
and Dworkin's contributions to contemporary constitutional
thought, saving Publius from contradiction does not necessitate
grounding his distinction between judgment and will in unworkable formalist assumptions. Not only are we not compelled to label
Publius a legal formalist, but viewing him as a formalist would require us to ignore the bulk of what he says about language, human
cognition, and judicial decision.
Nevertheless, some readers will say that parts of The FederalId. at 235-36.
121

Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 236.

122

Federalist 9 at 50, 51.

12

Federalist 14 at 83, 88-89.
Federalist 37 at 231, 238-39.

1

124

"I For statements of the conflict between Moore's realism and Dworkin's "deep conventionalism," see Moore, 58 S.Cal.L.Rev. at 298-301, 309, 363-66, 373 (cited in note 4); and
Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S.Cal.L.Rev. 453
(1987). See also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 135-39 (1986). This conflict need not concern us here, for both theories purport to account for the sense that legal-moral questions
are amenable to reason and need not be answered by willful imposition.
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ist do suggest a formalist's opposition to judicial discretion, or a
formalist equation of discretion with willfulness. There may be
three such sections. They involve (1) the principle of stare decisis;
(2) the distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law; and
(3) the adoption of the bill of rights. I shall discuss these sections
briefly.
Toward the conclusion of Federalist 78, Publius adds as "a
further and a weighty reason" in behalf of his proposal for judicial
tenure that such tenure enhances judicial expertise in ever swelling
bodies of statutes and case law. And since "strict rules and precedents" should govern judicial decision, life tenure helps to avoid
"an arbitrary discretion in the courts."' 2 6
Commentators who would consider taking The Federalistseriously might have been spared the statement that judges "should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case.' 1 7 For the unconstraining qualities of precedent and the question of where to
locate the ratio decidendi of a case are major problems of modern
jurisprudence. 128 Modern friends of Publius might therefore be
moved to further therapeutic construction of his remarks. They
might begin by noting that in the passage just quoted, Publius
speaks of avoiding "an arbitrary discretion." "Arbitrary" here
could signify an attribute of some, not all, acts of discretion, for, as
we have just seen, in the same number of The Federalist,Publius
refers to "judicial discretion" approvingly and as a term descriptive of the general process of deciding between conflicting laws.'
So while some discretion can be arbitrary and improper, some discretion is an aspect of what judges are supposed to do.' Thus, we
could see Publius in need of a theory of precedent that could reconcile discretion and the values served by the rule of precedent.
Such theories are available, and we might look for the one that
best fits Publius.' 3 1 Alternatively, we might change the subject

126

Federalist 78 at 521, 529.

127

Id.

128 For an overview, George C. Christie, Jurisprudence 919-60 (1973); Michael S. Moore,

Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in Laurence Goldstein, ed., Precedent and
Law 183 (1987). Powell shows the limited constraining power of rules of interpretation in
the founding period and in 65 Tex.L.Rev. at 862-89 (cited in note 9).
129 Federalist 78 at 521, 525 (cited in note 15).
120Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 31-39 (cited in note 102).
131 For a review of the options, see Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization (cited in note 128). For an application in constitutional criticism of what Moore calls
a "pure natural law theory" (a theory Moore rejects), see Barber, On What the Constitution
Means at 4-7 (cited in note 2).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:836

(from normative theory to history) by describing Publius's promise
of more or less mechanical decision as an attempt to defend the
Constitution by misleading the uninformed.
I shall attempt neither of these moves. Construing Publius's
statement about stare decisis in a manner most unfavorable to my
position, I simply conclude that the statement conflicts with the
larger thrust of Publius's views on the human propensity to disagreement and error and the discretionary aspects of legal interpretation. It may even conflict with Publius's assurances of the Constitution's supremacy over the judges. At best, precedent
constrains individual judges, not the judiciary as an institution.
Far from reinforcing the belief in the supremacy of a constitutional
document and its power to control events, a strict regime of precedent suggests that constitutional meaning is a product of the interpretive power of the courts, and perhaps of changing historical usi3 2
age generally.
Publius's friends may want to avoid imputing an unreasonable
ignorance to him and to account for what he says as calculated to
achieve some recognizable good-ratification of the Constitution,
for example. But they cannot accept his contradictions as part of
an authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. Though there
are important reasons for distinguishing interpretations of the law
from the law itself, as Publius does when he acknowledges that
judges can err, some interpretations of the law function as normative statements. These interpretations must be internally consistent with respect to their implications for specific actions, since
statements that indicate contradictory actions fail as prescriptions.
Accepting Publius's inconsistencies forces a quest for other normative authority (or movement from normative thought to condescending antiquarianism, descriptive history, or explanatory sociology) for it defeats the initial decision to treat The Federalistas a
prescriptive interpretation of the Constitution. What Publius says
about conflicts among laws applies to conflicting elements of prescriptive interpretations of the law: "So far as they can by any fair
construction be reconciled to each other; reason and law conspire
to dictate that this should be done. Where this is impracticable, it
becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of
'133
the other.
As fidelity to the law requires (among other things) excluding
parts that are inconsistent with the dominant thrust, fidelity to
'32
See
113

Powell, 98 Harv.L.Rev. at 910, 940-41 (cited in note 9).
Federalist 78 at 521, 525-26 (cited in note 15).
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Publius as a framer or authoritative interpreter of the law requires
a theory of his principal thrust, and a willingness to exclude or
cabin irreconcilable parts. So one must exclude Publius's statement about stare decisis if one is to accept Publius's implicit claim
to be an authoritative interpreter of the law. Accepting his statement about the binding character of precedent entails rejecting his
more fundamental contention that judicial review does not imply
judicial supremacy as well as all that he says about discretion, the
controversial qualities of legal interpretation, and the judicial obligation to mitigate the injustices of positive law. Fidelity to Publius
as a framer is fidelity to the most praiseworthy account of what he
stands for generally; it cannot mean fidelity to everything he might
say.
In a second statement suggesting a mechanical approach to judicial decision Publius responds to a charge involving the distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law. 34 Publius paraphrases the charge as follows:
The power of construing the laws, according to the spirit of
the constitution, will enable that [the Supreme] court to
mould them into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the
revision or correction of the legislative body. This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the judicial power
in the last resort, resides in the house of lords, which is a
branch of the legislature; and this part of the British government has been imitated in the State constitutions in
general.13 5
To this Publius replies,
there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration, which
directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the constitution, or which gives them
any greater latitude in this respect, than may be claimed by
the courts of every state.13 6
The evasive character of this response is plain, for Publius
avoids explicit comment on the indirect powers of courts, while inviting questions about these powers by underscoring the courts'
131 See Herbert J. Storing, 2 The Complete Antifederalist 417-19 (1981)(essays of
Brutus).
'35 Federalist 81 at 541, 542 (original emphasis) (cited in note 15).
136 Id. at 543 (original emphasis).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:836

lack of direct power. And in the sequel he implicitly concedes that
judicial decision may be guided by the spirit of the law. After his
initial response to the charge in question, Publius admits that "the
constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws,
and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to
give place to the constitution."' 7 He adds immediately that "this
doctrine [of judicial review] is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention; but from the general
theory of a limited constitution; and as far as it is true, is equally
applicable to most, if not to all the state governments."1 "8 Thus
does Publius himself decide an issue-the propriety of judicial review-by invoking "spirit" in the sense of "the general theory of a
limited constitution."
Three paragraphs later Publius denies that either Parliament
or the state legislatures "can rectify the exceptionable decisions of
their respective courts, in any other sense than might be done by a
future legislature of the United States." Notwithstanding final judicial authority in a committee of the Lords, "[t]he theory neither
of the British, nor the state constitutions, authorises the revisal of
a judicial sentence, by a legislative act." And the "impropriety of
the thing" in all these constitutions results from "the general principles of law and reason," not from "any thing in the proposed
constitution more than in either of them, by which it is forbidden."' 3 9 Here, then, is inference from spirit in a sense similar to
the first, namely, inference from general principles of law and reason. Publius's pointed statement that the Constitution does not
"directly" authorize construction according to the spirit should be
read in this context of reiterated inference from considerations beyond the letter. The letter does not anywhere authorize inference
from the spirit; it is the spirit that does so.
A third possible basis for contending that Publius holds a
mechanistic view of judicial decision is one of his comments in opposition to the adoption of a bill of rights. Like the preceding attempts to quiet fears of judicial discretion, Publius's opposition to
the bill of rights is at least in part a tactic for securing the Constitution's ratification. The Federalists realized after ratification that
a bill of rights could be made consistent with their constitutional
philosophy. 4 0 But during the ratification campaign the Anti-Fed,37
Id. at 543.
,38 Id.

,39Id. at 545.
,40Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights at 18 (cited in note 13).
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eralists invoked a tradition favoring bills of rights to demand that
ratification be conditioned on a bill of rights. This would have required a new constitutional convention or some other way to reopen the proposal of the Philadelphia Convention. And if some of
those most vocally demanding a bill of rights should have had their
way, reopening the proposed constitution would have undone the
basic plan. 141 Opposing the basic idea of bills of rights was one way
to forestall this result.
Publius argues in Federalist 84 that bills of rights are both
unnecessary and dangerous. They are unnecessary as limitations
on government where government cannot lawfully act without affirmative grants of authority. They are dangerous because prohibiting measures that are not authorized in the first place "would
afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For
why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power
to do?' 1 42 Publius also suggests some doubt about the propriety of

general normative ideas as judicially enforceable limitations on
governmental power. He says bills of rights are more appropriate
in monarchies than in democratic republics where electoral accountability "is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes
of those aphorisms" found in several state bills of rights "and
which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a
constitution of government. 1 43 He says no one can define "liberty
of the press" in a way that "would not leave the utmost latitude
for evasion . . .; and from this, I infer, that its security, whatever
fine [constitutional] declarations . . ., must altogether depend on

public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the
government.'

44

He says that "the constitution is itself in every ra-

tionale sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF
RIGHTS."4 5
Modern critics of judicial power have invoked these statements to argue for a judiciary concerned not primarily with substantive rights-especially substantive fourteenth amendment
rights like property and privacy-but with those individual and
minority rights that seem essential for the successful operation of
the Constitution's system of representative democracy. 1 46 This may
141 Id.
142

Federalist 84 at 575, 579 (cited in note 15).

113Id. at 579.

Id. at 580.
115 Id. at 581 (original emphasis).
144

"I See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Walter Berns, Taking the
Constitution Seriously 124-29, 214-29 (1987). The difficulties of these theories beyond their
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be one way of reconciling Federalist84 with Publius's definition in
Federalist 78 of "limited constitution" in terms of judicially enforced exemptions from governmental power. 4 ' Another way
would be to acknowledge the importance of structure, but to recognize a full-fledged judicial power as an essential part of a structure
whose very purpose is to make democracy defensible by reconciling
it to justice.
In this connection one can observe that Federalist 84 is not
really opposed to a judicially enforced bill of rights as part of a
broader structure. What Publius opposes are the proposals for a
separate bill of rights, perhaps as a condition for ratification, and
preoccupation with a bill of rights as a substitute for the other
structural means for protecting rights. When he says the Constitution is itself a bill of rights he can hardly mean that the Constitution would be adequate to its purposes without a practice of judicially enforced rights, for he immediately proceeds to describe in a
general way the judicially enforceable rights that the unamended
constitution already recognizes. Thus, the Constitution already
secures "one object of a bill of rights" when it "declare[s] and
specif[ies] the political privileges of the citizens in the structure
and administration of the government."' 4 8 The unamended constitution serves "another object of a bill of rights" by protecting "certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to
personal and private concerns."'4 9 These things have "been attended to, in a variety of cases," in the unamended plan, says Publius. And as we read the unamended plan, we find support for his
claim in the document's listing of such exemptions as the prohibition against titles of nobility and religious tests for office; a guarantee of the Confederation's debts; a jury trial provision; a narrow
definition of treason, prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, and state impairments of contractual obligations; and a
habeas corpus guarantee. These existing provisions entitle Publius
to say: "Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of
rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of
the convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough,
though it will not be easy to make this appear; but it can with no
propriety be contended that there is no such thing."'150 And he

relevance to The Federalistdo not concern me here.
117 Federalist 8 at 521, 524 (cited in note 15).
"

Federalist 84 at 575, 581.

149

Id.

150 Id.
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adds that "[i]t certainly must be immaterial" whether the rights
bill of rights or
that a constitution contains be listed as a separate
15 1
incorporated in the document some other way.
When modern critics of judicial power invoke Federalist 84
against judicially declared substantive rights under open-ended
constitutional provisions, they ignore the implications of Publius's
concession that the rights of the unamended constitution "may
. . . not go far enough.' 1 52 This statement further attests Publius's
appreciation of the Convention's "fallibility" and the resulting
need "to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors,
as a future experience may unfold them.' 1 53 Whether Publius and
his generation went far enough in their declaration of
rights-whether, in other words, they gave enough power to
judges-must depend in part on whether the structure they provided proves adequate to the ends they sought. This approach to
the question is consistent with Publius's understanding of structures as means, his belief that an independent and permanent judiciary is consistent with republicanism, his realistic view of the nature of judicial decision, and, above all, his view that democracy
unreconciled to higher standards is indefensible.
Yet this conclusion may beg the question whether Publius
could have approved the kind of judicial discretion that the Supreme Court has thought the fourteenth and ninth amendments
require. Critics of judicial power are entitled to ask what we are to
make of Publius's statement that the typical provisions of bills of
rights are more appropriate in treatises on ethics than in constitutions of government. Does this not imply that Publius looked on
decisions in constitutional cases as excluding moral judgments, deriving instead from essentially factual judgments about the meaning of legal provisions, or the implications of the Constitution's arrangement of offices and powers, or the specific intentions of those
whose authority the Constitution asserts, no matter how corrupt?
These matters may be controversial, as any allegedly factual matter may be, but does not Publius's belittling reference to treatises
of ethics suggest that these facts are noncontroversial in principle?
Moreover, is not the task of judges essentially one of historical research and conceptual inference unmixed with inquiry into the
best understanding of the ends of government? I have contended
here that Publius's strong support of judicial independence does

151

152

"I

Id.
Id.
Federalist 37 at 231, 233.
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not presuppose that the application of constitutional provisions
and other laws are matters free of controversy. But are the controversies whose propriety Publius acknowledges essentially factual
controversies and matters of inference that would exclude reflection and judgment about the ends of government as such?
Our question at this point, then, is whether one can weigh all
that Publius says and impute to him a theory that excludes moral
judgments from decisions in constitutional cases. I think the answer is no. To show this I shall put aside what he says about judges
protecting constitutional rights and his approval of judges "mitigating the severity" of "unjust and partial laws" even where there
is no question of constitutional infraction.154 Instead, I shall limit
the present part of my argument to issues involving not rights, but
the scope of governmental powers. I do this because Publius's argument against a bill of rights includes the claim that the enumeration of powers renders a bill of rights unnecessary. 155 Since he
says nothing about a bill of rights to suggest that he abandons his
earlier argument for judicial review, one can infer that Publius
would at least support adjudication of claims involving the enumeration of powers, like the scope of the commerce power and the
powers to tax and spend.
I have argued above that power for Publius implies governmental duty in behalf of ends that the grants of power envision. A
court cannot address questions of power, therefore, without forming judgments about ends. "Not to confer in each case a degree of
power, commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety," says Publius, "and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands, which
are disabled from managing them with vigour and success."' 56 And
his own description of the ends of power goes considerably beyond
what is explicit in the enumeration of powers of Article I, § 8. He
says, for example, that one of the "principal purposes to be answered by Union" is "the common defence of the members," and
that the national government "ought to be cloathed with all the
powers requisite to complete execution of its trust," presumably no
matter what inherently unpredictable circumstances might
require,
15
and regardless of conflicting claims of states' rights. 1
Of course, the few separate provisions of Article I, § 8 that

"' Federalist

78 at 521, 528.
"5 Federalist 84 at 575, 579-80.
156 Federalist 23 at 146, 149.
15 Id. at 146-47. See also Federalist 34 at 209, 210-12.
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mention power over the armed forces, taxing and spending for national defense, and other relevant powers do not and cannot add
up to all that it would take to defend the nation in all circumstances. 158 Nor must the supremacy clause of Article VI be read to
say that the national government can serve its conceptions of national defense without regard for the values arguably served, and
served exclusively, by the states, like those aspects of community
autonomy and aspiration that determine how properly to educate
the youth. The states could, of course, exercise such powers to the
detriment of what Congress might believe to be skills and attitudes
essential to the national defense, a national market, an ever expanding gross national product, or what Publius calls "the public
peace" of the nation as a whole.1 59 The Supreme Court cannot simply elevate national power over state power. It can only recognize
the supremacy of "this Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof," as Article VI
states. And this language presupposes some general conception of
what state of affairs the Constitution, as a whole, envisions. Questions of constitutional power always proceed from such conceptions; all such conceptions are controversial, and no one conception
can be defended as a matter of objective fact unmixed with controversy over better and worse results. 6 '
Thus, in commentary on John Marshall's famous exposition of
the general principles of federal power in McCulloch v. Maryland,
even a modern critic of judicial power like Walter Berns can acknowledge that the issue between a strict and liberal construction
of national power requires nothing less than a judicial choice between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian conceptions of "the purposes
of the Constitution or, in short, the kind of country the United
States was intended to be." Berns correctly says the options facing
Marshall embraced different ways of government and even ways of
life. Marshall thus favored the Hamiltonian vision, requiring an industrial society and a powerful, executive-centered national government, not the older, agrarian-based republicanism valued by
16
Jefferson. 1
Little argument remains among contemporary constitutional
'51Louis

Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 15-19 (1972).
Federalist 23 at 146, 147 (cited in note 15).
,60 This fact may be reflected in Publius's own suggestion of similarities between the
"'

convention's task of drawing lines between state and national powers and some of the difficulties confronting "metaphysical Philosophers." Federalist 37 at 231, 234-35.
16, Walter Berns, The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in Goldwin, ed., A Nation of
States at 141-43 (cited in note 20).
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theorists that controversial philosophic considerations are also present in interesting "structural" questions, like the bases for legislative appointment and the extension of the franchise.'
At the
heart of his general theory of constitutional structures, Publius
himself says that the system of checks and balances is designed to
supply "the defect of better motives, '6 3 which suggests that a
grasp of these better motives, even a theory of the virtues, is essential to a full understanding of Publius's theory of checks and balances. As he explains the structural differences among the
branches of the national government and between the national
government and the state governments, he consistently refers to
the ends that such differences are likely to effect. Thus the structure of the national government will, he says, mitigate the impact
of majority faction on minority rights and the community's long
term interests.1 64 And the structure of the Senate will compensate
for the House's insensitivity to world opinion and what would otherwise be the absence in the government "of a due sense of national character."' 6 5
The substantive moral dimension of structural considerations
also appears when Publius interprets the executive as placed in a
strategic position to act, perhaps beyond expressly granted powers,
in ways that educate the public to the difference between its objective interests and its immediate inclinations. 6 More generally, as
we have seen, Publius says "[j]ustice is the end of government,"
and whatever the institutional arrangement, "[i]n a society under
the forms of which the stronger ..
oppress the weaker, anarchy
may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature.' ' 67 When the
American Revolution rejected "the impious doctrine . . that the
people were made for the kings," it rejected all forms of the doctrine "that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to
the views of political institutions .... "I"
Statements like these and the general tenor of Publius's defense of the Constitution leave little doubt that he understands in-
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16 Federalist 10 at 56, 57.
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166 Federalist 71 at 481, 482-83.
167 Federalist 51 at 347, 352.
18 Federalist 45 at 308, 309.

19881

Judicial Review and The Federalist

stitutions as means to ends. In accordance with general principles
of legal construction, which he recognizes in several places, questions concerning means are resolved by considering the ends envisioned.1" 9 And since Publius's formulation of the ends ("the common defense," "the public happiness," the "public peace") is as
general as the language of the Preamble, judges deciding structural
questions face unavoidable philosophic choices among such competing versions of those ends as the different versions favored by
Hamilton and Jefferson. If we grant that Publius's judiciary would
have taken up questions involving the scope of granted powers, we
are left with no principled and consistent understanding of judicial
power upon which Publius might have opposed judicial consideration of questions arising under the ninth and fourteenth
amendments.
Publius can support an independent judicial power and still
agree that, ultimately, the effective enjoyment of constitutional
rights will depend on public opinion. His statements that federal
judges will not share the public's prepossessions as much as elected
officials"' need not mean that judges will be completely insulated.
When he predicts the influence of public opinion on the judiciary
in Federalist84, he implicitly recognizes the obvious vulnerability
of all parts of the system to a sustained public sentiment. 71 That
public opinion can influence what judges say about general constitutional standards says nothing about the proper interpretation of
those standards, however, nor does it preclude a judicial role in
educating public opinion to better conceptions of constitutional
meaning. Recall the parallel cases of senatorial and executive responsibility. Publius is clear that sooner or later presidents and
senators will have to answer to the electorate. Yet he values the
presidency and the Senate partly for their capacity to transform
public opinion.
There is no compelling argument that Publius's constitutional
philosophy excludes a leadership role for the judiciary in behalf of
constitutional standards. I emphasize in this connection his treatment of the standards of public morality as conceptually independent of public opinion. We have also seen that these independent
standards are essential ingredients of his general theory of respon1" Federalist 40 at 258, 259-60.

Federalist 49 at 338, 341.
Publius says "the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought in all governments, and actually will in all free governments ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers." Federalist 63 at 422, 425.
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sible government. If the effective enjoyment of constitutional
rights depends on public opinion, and if the standards for defining
rights are conceptually independent of public opinion, it follows
that a responsible government will have to educate public opinion
to right opinions of those standards. As Publius conceives government's responsibilities, the ultimate influence of public opinion in
a constitutional democracy argues for turning public opinion
around, not following wherever it might lead.
II.B.1. ConstitutionalSupremacy as Popular Supremacy.
We come now to the final proposition of Publius's argument
for judicial review: constitutional supremacy means the supremacy
of the people. This proposition presupposes that (1) as a matter of
fact, all generations of Americans will share the same fundamental
political values, and (2) as a normative matter, the specific fundamental values that Americans share are, objectively, the right values. I shall examine each of these presuppositions.
An obvious objection to Publius's statement in Federalist78
that the Constitution expresses the supremacy of the people 172 is
the statement's failure to acknowledge a distinction between the
founding generation and subsequent generations-between the
people who established the Constitution and those who are to live
under it without enjoying the option of debating and ratifying it as
a whole. The founding generation itself recorded this difference in
the Preamble's paternalistic reference to "ourselves and our Posterity." And Publius draws a sharper distinction in Federalist49
when he suggests that the patriotic character of the founding generation will separate it from the generations of self-serving individuals that will follow. 1 73 From statements like this it would seem
that the Constitution is the will of the people of 1789 only, not the
people of subsequent generations. By Publius's own testimony,
therefore, he cannot claim that the Constitution is simply the will
of one people. And the unhappy facts of American history belie
Publius's implicit claims for the unity of his own generation and
subsequent generations, as well as a continuity of fundamental values from one generation to the next. How might Publius and his
modern defenders respond to this objection?
To see why Publius might have assumed a unity of values in
the face of apparent disunity, we should consider the implications
of his distinction between a people's objective interests and the in172 Federalist 78 at 521, 525.
17 Federalist 49 at 338, 341.
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clinations of its factional parts. We have seen this distinction at
work in Publius's basic understanding of responsible government:
"When . . . the interests of the people are at variance with their
inclinations," responsible "guardians of those interests" have a
duty to resist public opinion in order to give the public "time and
opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. ' 17 How much
time that might take is impossible to tell, for despite inevitable
concessions to time in a democracy, the real test of duty is not
time, but a certain result: the convergence of inclination and objective interest or the reconciliation of majoritarianism to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community and minority rights
conceived independently of majority will. Thus, five paragraphs after the sentence just quoted Publius says: "It cannot be affirmed,
that a [presidential] duration of four years or any other limited
duration would completely answer the end proposed.' 17 5 As a general principle of constitutional duty, constitutional officials should
try to change public opinion for the better no matter how long it
might take, and even if success is never fully realized.
This principle of constitutional duty enters into the intention
that Publius imputes to "the people" as a whole. He describes
elected officials as persons whom the people have appointed the
guardians of their objective interests. He says the people commonly intend the public good, acknowledge their capacity for error,
and despise adulators who pretend that they always reason correctly about the means of promoting their common interests.17 6
One can express Publius's distinction between inclinations and interests as that between what one initially thinks one wants and
what one really wants, the latter being what remains desirable after a process of deliberation and reflection. The distinction remains useful today, for most would not contend that elected officials should act on their perceptions of their constituents'
immediate wishes without deliberating medium-to-long-range consequences and consulting further with elements of the public in
light of those consequences. Grant Publius's distinction between
interests and inclinations and it becomes difficult to deny that
what the public really wants for itself is what will survive the transient moment as really good. If the people really want what is in
their interest, and if what is in their interest is determined by objective standards, then the people really want nothing less than
174 Federalist 71 at 481, 482-83.
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what is objectively in their interest. Sensing this, the people approve a system whose officials will tend to "withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more
cool and sedate reflection."'11 Such is Publius's view of how it is
possible for popular will to take the form of constitutional
government.
In light of Publius's view of the difference between the public's interests and inclinations, determining the public's wants is no
simple matter. An observer like Publius would first have to discover what objectively serves minority rights and the "permanent
and aggregate interests of the community." This knowledge would
proceed not from purely subjective preferences but from a philosophic-scientific grasp of the ends of government and their effective implementation. That objectively better and worse grasps are
possible is a presupposition of the distinction between interests
and inclinations and its corollaries, like Publius's conception of responsible government and his definition of faction. Because Publius calls for reconciling inclinations to interests, our observer
would have to form speculative factual judgments concerning the
public's capacity to appreciate and act consistently with economic
and social arrangements that are conducive to the public good.
From premises concerning the ends of government and the public's
capacities, our observer would form a theory of the best in us, and
that theory would include a statement of our fundamental values.
Such a theory would be an exercise in political philosophy as a
practical science of human affairs. It would utilize knowledge of
the kind Publius proudly claims when referring to the new "science
18
of politics."'
Assuming, then, that our fundamental values would be given'
by a valid theory of the best in us, not by variable expressions of
public sentiment, one basic set of values could lie behind the conflicts that mark American history. Thus, some writers argue that
the republic has from the beginning been committed to the secular
pursuits and democratic social relationships of an urban-industrial
society devoted primarily to individual economic gain and an ever
expanding GNP.17 9 I am not interested here in the truth of such
177 Id. at 482.

178 Federalist 9 at 50, 51.
See, for example, Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy 631 (1972); Barber, On What the Constitution
Means at 63-168 (cited in note 2); Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously at 173-80 (cited
in note 146); Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Modern Presidency and the Constitution, in Martin L.
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theories. Our question is how Publius might assume a single set of
fundamental values in the face of historical disagreements, and the
answer lies in what kind of thing "fundamental values" might be
and how one discovers them. Because fundamental values are
given only by political theories of the best in us, their existence
depends on the possibility of a successful theory, a possibility
whose meaning is itself a theoretical matter.
Granting that in a democracy the success of a theory would
depend in part (and only in part, for objective values would be at
stake) on the public's recognition, Publius, as we have seen, would
not demand immediate public recognition. A successful theory
would depend, therefore, on its accessibility to the general public,
or on the capacity of the public to be brought by political leadership to accept a true account of its real values.
The facts of historical conflict alone would not be enough to
decide the question whether the public's potential included an appreciation of its better self. Publius does seem to recognize that it
is impossible as a practical matter indefinitely to delay government's accountability to the electorate's immediate inclinations. If
government does not succeed in turning public opinion around, officials of all sorts, including judges, pay the price. Nothing guarantees success; government can fail to make the public sensible of its
true interests and its higher constitutional aspirations. But government's failure is not enough to settle questions of what the public's
true interests and constitutional aspirations are. If these values exist, and Publius assumes that they do exist, their content is a philosophic question. Popular government is far from competent to determine the content of fundamental values; it is rather the case
that the cause of popular government depends on the people's capacity to live up to those fundamental values, or so Publius holds.
Historical conflict may therefore catch up with and defeat constitutional government without invalidating a theory of what our constitutional values are.
Rather than undermining the proposition that a people value
certain fundamental principles, historical conflict is itself an essential condition for the significance of that proposition. Clearly, persons who actively debate normative questions presuppose answers
that are objectively correct, either by nature or at least with reference to some unquestioned or posited conventional foundation.
"Norms" that are unquestionable or unquestioned by a given peoFausold and Alan Shank, eds., The Constitution and the American Presidency
(forthcoming).
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ple are behavioral regularities, not norms, since any form of words
that would guide conduct presupposes the possibility of deliberate
deviation, and awareness of that possibility is sufficient to render
the form of words debatable. 8 ' A people holds a norm as such not
through unquestioning adherence, but through some process of reaffirmation or aspirational striving, both of which entail some kind
of disagreement."8"
That an observer of a people can sometimes interpret its conflicts as forms of reaffirmation and striving is familiar enough, both
from the rhetoric of our politicians and the commentaries of scholars. The Gettysburg Address is a clear example of interpreting conflict as striving to realize fundamental national aspirations. And
John Hart Ely has recently interpreted virtually the entire course
of American history from the Declaration of Independence as the
progressive fulfillment of an "original commitment to control by a
majority of the governed."' 8 2 The reader should note that Ely imputes this majoritarian aspiration to all generations of Americans
despite the continuing and sometimes violent controversy over its
validity. Without debating the merits of such imputations here, I
note only that people do make them; it is possible, and perhaps
fairly so, to impute underlying values to a people despite their conflicts and in the face of historical change.
II.B.2. Are Our Values Really Worth Holding?
The second presupposition of Publius's argument that constitutional supremacy insures popular supremacy concerns the normative status of the fundamental values involved. The presupposition just discussed raises a different kind of question; though
mixed with normative judgments, it has a factual side in that it
identifies the political aspirations of a historical community and its
posterity. Although this "factual" presupposition does involve philosophic inquiry into the public interest and analysis of historical
statements about the common good and its institutions, its dominant thrust is nevertheless descriptive; it is not immediately hortatory. "Such and so is what this people stands for," says the first
presupposition. "And that's good," says the second, "that's what
they ought to stand for."
"' See generally, Richard E. Flathman, Political Obligation 156-58 (1972).
182See Barber, On what the Constitution Means at 59-61, 84-85 (cited in note 2). See
also Michael J. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A "Naturalist" Perspective, 20 Ga.L.Rev. 995, 1030-39 (1986).
182 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 5-7 (cited in note 146).
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That Publius assumes this second proposition is evident from
two considerations. First, his argument for judicial review is part of
a broader argument in behalf of ratification. He is not just commenting on a people and its institutions. He is proposing a course
of action and thereby assuming a good to be achieved by all to
whom his proposal is addressed, namely, the founding, generation
and its posterity. Second, Publius recognizes a right of the people
to alter any form of government that proves oppressive or inadequate to their happiness. An aspect of this right of revolution is a
right of one part of a single people to separate itself from other.
parts. In a passage of Federalist 14, Publius argues that adoption
of the proposed constitution is essential to the union's survival,
and he entreats his audience to "[h]earken not to the unnatural
voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as
they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together
as members of the same family."'183 This passage presupposes a
right to do what it prays not be done, as does The Federalist as a
whole in submitting a proposal for the public's adoption or rejection. By proposing something based on beliefs which can, but need
not, unite all generations of Americans, Publius recommends these
beliefs to all.
But if Publius did affirm one set of fundamental values, we
can ask whether it was reasonable to have done so and what his
values might have been. Although the fundamental values of a people are given by a theory of the best they are capable of-i.e., the
closest their collective capacities and material conditions can bring
them to an ideal state of affairs-the prospect of technological, attitudinal, environmental, and other forms of change renders problematic any particular version of a people's ultimate capacities.
And as their capacities change, so might their views of the ideal
state to which they refer those capacities in arriving at theories of
their fundamental values. How, then can Publius reasonably assume that one set of values ought to unite all generations of Americans? I address this question here not so much to defend any particular conception of America's fundamental values, but to defend
the proposition that Publius presupposes one set of fundamental
values. The reasonableness of Publius's presupposition depends on
whether any of his values can claim transhistorical status.
Now, recalling Publius's belief in the rights of a people to revolt against their traditional political authorities and to dissolve
"I Federalist 14 at 83, 88 (cited in note 15).
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even some of their social relationships, our question is whether
there is a set of values that, whatever its precise social and institutional manifestations, (1) characterizes America, yet (2) remains
open to the need to reexamine established ways of life and government and the values that ground them. If there is such a set of
values, perhaps it has to do with reason in public affairs, the value
to which Publius appeals in Federalist1 as the object of this country's aspirations, the source of its status among nations, and its
greatest contribution to humankind. 8 4 The practice of reasoning in
public affairs is the value that he continually invokes throughout
his justifications of a strong national government. Publius defends
that government as an institutional arrangement which manifests
his belief that "it is the reason of the public alone that ought to
controul and regulate the government," while "[t]he passions
ought to be controuled and regulated by the government."' s And
the connection between reason and the national character that one
finds in Federalist1 is echoed from Publius's praise of the nation's
experimental attitude toward forms of government,8 " to his call
for a Senate capable of assessing policy against "the presumed or
known opinion of the impartial world."' 87
Passages like these enable one to propose that the fundamental values of Publius's regime would center on the aspiration to be
and to appear reasonable to all who might be affected by the regime or take an interest in it-potentially, to all of humankind. An
aspiration to be and appear reasonable is certainly a commonplace
of Enlightenment liberalism and one way to label the common
ground of moral realists as diverse as Plato and Kant. It is a commonplace, in other words, that would paper over mountains of
philosophic and institutional problems, for it is one thing to name
a value, but quite another to grasp its intrinsic nature and explicate its practical implications. Yet, in this case, there may be more
to a name than just a name, for debates over the nature and manifestations of reason in public affairs typically proceed through exchanges of what are called reasons. And perhaps they must proceed in this way, for it is at least arguable that one cannot have a
reasoned rejection of reason's authority. 18 8 We may thus be thrown
back upon our commonsense intuitions about reason, reasoning

, 4 Federalist 1 at 3, 3-5.
x" Federalist 49 at 338, 343.
188 Federalist 14 at 83, 88-89.
,s Federalist 63 at 422, 423.
188 Barber, On What the Constitution Means at 224-25 n.43 (cited in note 2).
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and reasonable people in our philosophic quests for the nature and
practical implications of reason. The empirical fact seems to be
that we do start out with a general idea of what reason imports-for example, its opposition to religious zealotry and its indifference to personalities, or so Publius suggests.18 9 We also know
what, in principle, a reasonable resolution would be-one in which
reasonable persons can concur. The circularity of thought about
reason may of course indicate the limits of thought, but it may also
suggest the irreducible, and therefore imperfectly describable, capacity that we all typically possess in some measure-our nature,
so to speak. In any case, for all the unresolved problems, the value
of reason can at least claim transhistorical status. It also seems opposed to some political and social possibilities, and it is certainly
plausible to say that the authors of The Federalistfancied themselves committed to it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Publius's treatment of the Articles of Confederation raises one
final problem for consideration in this paper: the relationship between fundamental values and the constitutional document. Does
Publius assume that the written constitution successfully embodies
his commitment to reason in public affairs? In saying that the
Constitution is the most authoritative voice of the people, can
Publius reasonably suppose that the Constitution's institutional
arrangement will continue to manifest the commitment to reason
that makes his generation and the generations that follow one people, to the extent that they are and will remain one people?
If by "the Constitution" we refer to the document of 1789 and
its amendments, the answer to our question must be no, for at
least two obvious reasons. First, Publius acknowledges that political exigencies forced the delegates at Philadelphia to depart from
standards of just and even civilized conduct in several respects,
like provisions respecting slavery1 90 and equal representation of the
states in the Senate regardless of their size.191 Second, as the subject of a mere political proposal, the document is to be tested
against the requirements of reason, and therefore cannot itself be a
simple manifestation of those requirements. Thus, it will always
make sense to ask whether the document is as good as it can be.

Federalist 1 at 3, 5-6 (cited in note 15).
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Publius expressly submits the document to the electorate partly as
a means to the ends of government, and though ratification will
make the document "supreme Law," Publius's treatment of the
Articles supplies a precedent, if one is needed, applicable to all
partially instrumental institutions. Answering criticism of the Philadelphia Convention's disregard of the original charge merely to
amend the Articles of Confederation, Publius insists, at bottom,
that "the happiness of the people of America," is simply more important than preserving the Articles. 92
Publius also believes the "successors" of those "leaders" who
first "accomplished a revolution" and subsequently "formed the
design of a great confederacy" are obligated to "improve and perpetuate" it.' This obligation is higher in authority than the positive law it disregards, and Publius accepts it as consistent with a
tradition which is praiseworthy for its capacity to disregard conventional barriers to what reason recognizes in changing circumstances as arrangements conducive to "private rights and public
happiness." As a proposal originally submitted to the reasoned deliberation of the public, there is a sense in which the Constitution
originates in an act of deliberate public choice and remains
subordinate to that authority. So, as a document, the Constitution
cannot fully embody reason in public affairs.
How, then, if reason remains the highest authority, can Publius believe that the Constitution is the people's most authoritative
voice? If there is an answer to this question it may be that the
amendable, defeasible document is not the real constitution for
Publius, or at least not the heart of it. The essential dimension of
the complex totality we call "the Constitution" would be the abstract idea of popular self-government in which the reason of the
public rules the passions. This general idea would entail no particular arrangement of offices and powers. And it would be unconstitutional to deny its influence on the construction of subordinate
arrangements. Publius's thought and Publius's example lead us in
this direction.
In any case, I have taken The Federalistas a leading source of
evidence for "framers' intent." Acknowledging that its general import is a subject of controversy, I have outlined what I believe to
be a plausible interpretation. I think there is much evidence that
Publius does not regard majoritarian democracy as the primary political value. He rejects government by majority faction. He claims
191
193

Federalist 40 at 258, 260.

Federalist 14 at 83, 89.

1988]

Judicial Review and The Federalist

that it is his great objective to reconcile popular government to
higher standards of political morality. He considers democracy
worth saving only if he can replace unrestrained majoritarianism
with self-restrained or constitutional democracy. His plan for
achieving this objective depends in part on a strong and independent judiciary charged with both the duties of judicial review and
the mitigation of majoritarian injustices. Though he leaves some
room for other entities to oppose judicial interpretations of the
Constitution, he seems willing to err on the side of judicial power
because he connects the judiciary with the value of reason and the
function of maintaining governmental responsibility to higher
standards. He hardly seems willing to sacrifice or subordinate this
higher constitutional responsibility to democratic responsiveness.
The presuppositions of Publius's plan are still worth debating, for
although they are controversial, they are hardly without formidable modern support. We therefore have no compelling theoretical
reason to construe Publius as a majoritarian democrat or in any
other manner that denies the institutional implications of his theory of governmental responsibility to higher standards.

